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THE SEXUAL INJUSTICE OF THE
TRADITIONAL FAMILY
Jane E. Larsont
As our moderator and first speaker pointed out, the premise of
the title of this panel-"individual rights and family responsibil-
ity"-posits that increased individual rights for family members
leads to a decline in family responsibility. We should start by defin-
ing the terms "individual rights" and "family responsibility" so that
we know what we are talking about when we make that presumption.
As Professor Fox-Genovese pointed out, over the last generation, it
is largely women who have demanded legal and social recognition
as individuals within the family (and not just as mothers and wives),
and it is increasingly men who have financially and emotionally
abandoned their families. It is these linked developments, largely
gender-specific in character, that lead to the modem perception that
families are in crisis. In my remarks today, I want to approach the
question posed for this panel in a slightly reframed form. My query
is, "How is men's irresponsibility to family causally related to wo-
men's assertion of individual rights?"
My contention is that the traditional family model was built on
the presumption that men could be "roped" into taking emotional
and financial responsibility for mothers and children only if fathers
were granted virtual dominion as family head. By law and custom,
fathers were made small kings in their family fiefdoms with virtually
unchecked authority over their dependents. For example, under an
ancient rule of family law explained in an 1868 North Carolina
case,' wife beating was permitted on the ground that "every house-
hold has and must have a government of its own, modeled to suit
the temper, disposition and condition of its inmates, and we will not
intervene or attempt to control it. '"2 Another example is that under
the "modem" rule of family law still prevailing in many states, we
recognize the right of a husband to rape his wife without legal
consequence.3
t Assistant Professor, NorthWestern University School of Law. J.D., University
Minnesota Law School, 1985.
1 State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (1868).
2 Id at 457.
3 Anne L. Buckborough, Family Law: Recent Developments in the Law of Marital Rape,
1989 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 343 (1989).
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As women have demanded justice within the family-legal
equality with their male partners, shared responsibility for the work
necessary to sustain the family community, and meaningful guaran-
tees of economic support the traditional bargain has unraveled. Be-
cause women have been compelled to trade away their rights as
individuals in order to get men's commitment to their families,
when women turn around and claim justice within the family, it ap-
pears to be a breach of the traditional contract. Because they view
women as having breached the contract, men apparently feel justi-
fied in walking away from the "deal," both figuratively and literally.
The notion that women must sacrifice individual rights in a
political bargain to gain family rights as mothers sounds profoundly
illiberal. I mean "illiberal" in the sense that the Federalist Society
uses the term. That is, such a trade-off violates the classically liberal
political vision of free and equal individuals as the foundation of
society.4 But in fact, the sexual injustice of the traditional family has
roots in classical liberal political theory that can be traced back to
Rousseau.
In Emile,5 a tract on the education of young people for citizen-
ship, Rousseau argues that if women refuse to take a subordinate
role in the family, men in turn will refuse to be fathers because they
will no longer enjoy what they expect to gain from family life.6 For
women to get their children's fathers to support them, Rousseau ex-
plains, women must coax men into marriage and then must cater to
their needs. Married women recognizing that dependence and sub-
ordination within the marriage relationship is necessary, should not
seek independent goals, such as careers, or demand equality with
the father in family governance, for this creates strife and under-
mines family unity.7
It is either refreshing or grim to note that Rousseau, as well as
his modem-day defenders such as Allan Bloom,8 openly acknowl-
edge that by egalitarian standards, this inequality of women within
families is unjust. Yet Bloom 9 and others, including some on this
panel, continue to defend this inequality as necessary to the survival
of families.
4 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287 (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 1960) ("[A]II Men are naturally in... a State of perfect Freedom to order their
Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the
bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any
other Man.") (emphasis omitted).
5 JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, EMILE 333-34 (Barbara Foxley trans., 1911).
6 Id. at 324.
7 Id. at 324-26.
8 ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 115-16 (1987).
9 Id. at 115, 128-31.
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Feminism has directly challenged this political justification for
the traditional family by asking why the family-with its sex-specific
division of labor and the related economic vulnerability of mothers
and homemakers-should be immune to the same principles ofjus-
tice that govern all other institutions of society. 10 Further, because
women feel no inherent conflict between their identity as individuals
and their identity as parents, women have made these claims for
family justice in defense of the family, as well as in the name of women
as individuals. For the family is a "school of justice," to use the
term of political philosopher Susan Moller Okin.11 Children's
moral development is centered in families. In this sense, Okin ar-
gues that "[r]ather than being one among many co-equal institu-
tions of a just liberal society, a just family is its essential
foundation." 12 Justice in the family is perhaps even more important
than justice in any other social institution.
Thus, any discussion of family law that begins from the premise
that individual rights threaten family responsibility can be true only
to the extent that (1) we remain willing to allow men to make com-
mitment to their families contingent on unjust claims to authority
over other family members, and (2) we accept the view that justice is
somehow incompatible with the intimacy, harmony, altruism, gener-
osity, and love we seek in our family lives. Families are essential to
our society, and public policymakers should be profoundly con-
cerned with the well-being of families. It is within families that we
raise children, and it is there that we seek and give the love and
companionship that makes it possible for us to survive the loneliness
and harshness of our lives. Personal and social well-being, now and
in the future, demand that we do both things well.
To balance the claims of individual rights and family responsi-
bility in crafting our family law, however, we need a new vision of
the social contract underlying the family. Whatever the imagined
practical virtues of a social vision that demanded women's subordi-
nation as a condition for male involvement in the family, or that
posited an inherent conflict between justice and the family, such a
view imposes too high a cost-both in the way it undermines women
as full citizens in our society, and in the way it fundamentally sub-
verts the moral education of our children. Thank you.
10 See generally SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSnCE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989) (any
adequate theory of moral and social justice must take account of the family).
II Id at 17.
12 Id.
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